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A lot of new viruses are being created each and every day. However, some of these viruses are 
not completely new per se. Most of the supposedly ‘new’ viruses are not necessarily created 
from scratch with completely new (something novel that has never been seen before) 
mechanisms. For example, some of these viruses just change their forms and come up with 
new signatures to avoid detection. Hence, such viruses cannot be argued to be new. This 
research refers to such as derived viruses. Just like new viruses, we argue that derived viruses 
are hard to detect with current scanning-detection methods. 
Many virus detection methods exist in the literature, but very few address the detection of 
derived viruses. Hence, the ultimate research question that this study aims to answer is; how 
might we improve the detection rate of derived computer viruses? 
 The proposed system integrates a mutation engine together with a neural network to detect 
derived viruses. Derived viruses come from existing viruses that change their forms. They do 
so by adding some irrelevant instructions that will not alter the intended purpose of the virus.  
A mutation engine is used to group existing virus signatures based on their similarities. The 
engine then creates derivatives of groups of signatures. This is done up until the third generation 
(of mutations). The existing virus signatures and the created derivatives are both used to train 
the neural network. 
The derived signatures that are not used for the training are used to determine the effectiveness 
of the neural network. Ten experiments were conducted on each of the three derived virus 
generations. The first generation showed the highest derived virus detection rate compared to 
the other two generations. The second generation also showed a slightly higher detection rate 
than the third generation which has the least detection rate. 
xiv 
 
Experimental results show that the proposed model can detect derived viruses with an average 
accuracy detection rate of 80% (This includes a 91% success rate on first generation, 83% 
success rate on second generation and 65% success rate on third generation). The results further 
show that the correlation between the original virus signature and its derivatives decreases with 
the generations. This means that after many generations of a virus changing form, its variants 
will no longer look like the original. Instead the variants look like a completely new virus even 
though the variants and the original virus will always have the same behaviour and operational 
characteristics with similar effects.
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 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of this dissertation and starts with a motivation of the study. 
This is followed by a brief discussion on the problem statement which continues with a 
statement on research question that the work aims to answer and a discussion on the aims and 
objectives of the study.  A discussion on the scope and limitation of the study is then presented. 
The chapter also provides a definition of terms as defined for the purposes of this dissertation 
and concludes with an overview of the organization of the rest of this dissertation. 
1.2 Motivation 
Computer viruses come with a wide variety of nefarious activities that range from consuming 
an excess of memory to showing some funny and peculiar actions and  performing serious 
temporary or permanent damage to computing systems (Filiol, 2005). Criminals are now using 
viruses to hijack and take over computers from unsuspecting users. Hijacked computers are 
then used to create botnets to spread spam, perform a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
and steal digital identities. Therefore, the effects of computer viruses have moved from just 
showing annoying messages on the screen, for example, to having an impact on company 
reputation and affecting business characteristics.  
Several attempts have been made by a wide variety of anti-virus programs to solve the prevalent 
virus problem in computing systems. For example, McAfee, Symantec's Norton and Kaspersky 
are just a few of the market leaders in the anti-virus industry. In spite of all available anti-virus 
programs in the market today, virus attacks do not seem to slow down. Singhal (2014) has 
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stated that it is possible for a computer that is connected to the internet to experience a virus 
attack every 39 seconds. This could mean that at least 2215 computers are being infected by 
virus on a daily basis. 
Computer viruses are argued to cost businesses billions of dollars and the cost of the damage 
is increasing yearly. The increasing cost of damage from viruses can be attributed to the fact 
that new viruses are being created each day (Daoud, 2009). However, some of these supposedly 
‘new’ viruses are not entirely ‘new’ per se. Most of the supposedly ‘new’ viruses are not 
necessarily created from scratch with completely ‘new’ characteristics and attack mechanisms. 
They just change their form and come up with different signatures to avoid detection (Feng & 
Gupta, 2009). Hence, such viruses cannot be argued to be ‘new’. Examples of such viruses are 
polymorphic and metamorphic viruses. A polymorphic virus uses a mutation engine to change 
the virus code without changing the original algorithm (Khari & Bajaj, 2014). A metamorphic 
virus uses obfuscation techniques to generate a different virus body but with the same overall 
functionalities as with the original (Singla et al., 2015). This research refers to both of them as 
“derived viruses”. A derived virus is a type of virus that modifies itself to produce another virus 
body from an existing virus while maintaining the same functionalities as the original. Just like 
new viruses, derived viruses are hard to detect with current scanning-detection methods. This 
is because virus scanning-detection methods rely mainly on known or existing signatures. 
Derived viruses on the other hand, and, at their first attempt in  trying to infect a machine, do  
not have any known or existing signatures (Silverman, 2001). 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Since the first appearance of computer virus in the 1970s, there has been a lot of research 
targeted at solving the problem of virus attacks on computing devices. However, the protection 
of computing devices against viruses is still a major problem within the field of information 
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security (Khorsand & Hamzeh, 2013). A recent incident of a virus attack was reported in 
Kumar (2016) when the National Health Service network in England was compromised by a 
computer virus. This led to cancellation of planned surgeries and medical appointments in 
many hospitals. Hence, computer viruses at the extreme level could be argued to result in loss 
of life. This could happen when patients are prevented by the acts of a computer virus from 
getting the medical attention they need. 
Currently, computer viruses attack at least a million computers every year. This causes damage 
estimated to be billions of US dollars per year  (Kamarudin et al., 2013). A virus named 
“Mydoom” was reported to have caused damages worth 38.5 billion dollars. The virus attacks 
window based computers and gets transmitted primarily through emails. It was reported to be 
one of the most damaging computer virus ever (Rajesh et al., 2015). Similarly, another virus 
named “I Love You” was reported to have caused damage worth 8.75 billion dollars. This virus 
sends a copy of itself to every address on the host’s address book and overwrites files while it 
renders the original file useless. Once this virus is on a computer system, it downloads a Trojan 
horse which ‘steals’ usernames and passwords from the computer and sends them back to the 
virus author (Rajesh et al., 2015). An incident of a virus attack which made headlines was 
reported in Otake (2015) on a compromised Japanese pension system. This case led to 1.25 
million cases of personal details being leaked. The data were leaked by agency employees who 
opened a file containing a virus that was attached to an email. These are just a few of a number 
of examples indicating the massive damages which computer viruses have caused users and 
various organizations. 
Over the years, the number of computer viruses such as the one responsible for breaching the 
Japanese pension system has increased. The number of computer viruses in the year 1992 was 
estimated to be between 1000 and 2300 (Daoud, 2009). It is also reported by Daoud (2009) that 
over ten years since then, (i.e. in the year 2002) the number of known viruses had increased to 
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60,000. By 2009, there were over 100,000 known computer viruses (Daoud, 2009).  In year 
2016, Kaspersky Lab (2016) in their antivirus solution reported a total of 69,277,289 unique 
malicious viruses. This is against 4,000,000 unique malicious viruses that were reported by the 
same product in the previous year (i.e. in 2015) (Ivanov et al., 2015). These statistics reflects a 
1631.9% increase within a year, i.e. between 2015 and 2016. Furthermore, Symantec's internet 
security threat report shows a 125% increase in the number of zero-day vulnerabilities between 
2014 and 2015. This is an indication that todays’ threats are increasing at an exponential rate. 
Many of today’s threats are not new per se but just use some modern techniques to change 
forms thereby looking different each time while retaining their functionalities and basic 
characteristics. For example, nowadays, some virus writers are creating mutation engines.  
Mutation engines are used to create virus codes that have the ability to change their signatures 
at every infection to avoid detection. The self-modification ability that modern day viruses 
possess has put strain on the current scanning detection methods (Kumar, 2016).  
An example of such is a tool kit called the “Dark Avenger's Mutation Engine" (Muhtadi, 2014). 
This tool has the self-modification capability which makes it hard for current anti-virus tools 
to detect viruses. On the other hand, the same tool makes it easier even for non-programmers 
to create a virus that mutates. This is done in such a manner that in taking any two files infected 
by the same virus, their signatures appears to be totally different and without any correlation. 
Hence, it can be argued that the reported exponential increase in the number of viruses is 
somehow inflated. The increase may be due to some viruses using different techniques to 
change their form and signatures. Therefore, it could happen that the same virus could be 
detected more than once but each time as something completely different from the original 
signature. Existing signature based anti-virus tools have failed to detect mutating viruses and 
those that have made successful attempts have a low detection rate (Hamza & Hussain, 2014). 
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In a bid to increase the detection rate of computer virus, many studies (as reported in the known 
literature) have focused on virus detection methods. However, only a few of these address the 
detection of derived viruses that change their form or signature. For example, Wang et al. 
(2009) proposes a method of detecting mutating virus by using a candidate virus gene library. 
The major drawback of their proposed method is the inability to increase the diversity of the 
genes in the virus library. The work of Nguyen et al. (2012) proposed a method based on 
memory abstraction for handling obfuscation in what they refer to as a polymorphic virus. The 
major characteristic of a polymorphic virus is its self-modification ability. However, the 
challenge of the proposed solution therein is that it requires an abstract form that captures the 
memory state of every executed instruction. Hence, Golovko & Bezobrazov (2015) argue that 
the best modern anti-virus tools can only detect 90% of known viruses and 70% of mutating or 
polymorphic viruses.  
The detection of a derived virus remains the greatest threat, not because it is worse than a 
normal virus in terms of the damage it causes, but because it is hard to detect by current 
detection techniques as it changes its ‘look’ at every infection. The research reported in this 
dissertation therefore explores a novel approach to try and improve the detection rate of derived 
viruses. The following section discusses the research question that this study aims to answer. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The ultimate research question that this study aims to answer is; how might we improve the 
detection rate of derived computer viruses?  
1.5 Research Aim 
This research aims to derive  a virus detection model to help improve the rate of detecting 
derived viruses from 70% as per Golovko & Bezobrazov (2015). 
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1.6 Research Objectives 
The above aim is accomplished by fulfilling the following research objectives: 
1. Investigate and review existing literature on computer virus detection in order to 
examine the reasons behind the failure of current detection methods in detecting derived 
viruses. 
2. Design, develop and evaluate a model that correctly classifies virus signatures into 
existing or derived forms 
3. Finally, make recommendations on how to further improve the detection rate of derived 
viruses. 
1.7 Scope and Limitation 
The scope of the research reported in this dissertation is limited in the sense that it only 
considers virus signatures of a fixed length i.e. 32 bytes. This is because our solution requires 
the input to be represented as a fixed-length feature vector  (Le et al., 2014). Furthermore, this 
research scope does not consider virus signatures with special characters and those that are 
encrypted. It only considers virus signatures that are limited to the normal character set i.e. 0-
9, a – z and A – Z. 
1.8 Definition of Terms 
A few terms are defined in this section, as used throughout this dissertation: 
 Virus: Hamza & Hussain (2014) defines a virus as a program that can make copies of 
itself using a host computer and eventually causes  temporary or permanent damage to 
the system. Nguyen et al. (2012)  defines a virus as a block of binary code that can copy 
itself from one program into another without the knowledge of the program owner. 
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According to Dhruw et al. (2016), a computer virus is a piece of software that infects 
other programs within a computing device by modifying them. Based on these 
definitions and for the purposes of this dissertation, we define a computer virus as a 
piece of computer code that replicates itself by attaching itself to a host computer and 
performs unwanted operations within the computer system.  
 Virus Signature: Mishra (2010) defines a virus signature as a sequence of bytes that can 
be found in a virus program code but is unlikely to be found in any other place. 
According to Zhong et al. (2012), a virus signature is a specific pattern of sequences of 
bytes that defines a virus. Khorsand & Hamzeh (2013) defines a virus signature as a 
unique byte sequence of the virus program code. Based on the definitions above and 
for the purposes of this dissertation, we define a virus signature as a unique string of 
characters or numbers that makes up a fingerprint that can be used to identify a virus. 
Our definition excludes special characters. 
 Existing Virus: A virus whose signature is already known to the current virus detecting 
techniques. 
 Metamorphic Virus: Dhruw et al. (2016) define a metamorphic virus as a virus that 
mutates by rewriting itself at every infection. Kakad et al. (2014) define a metamorphic 
virus as a type of virus that uses code obfuscation techniques to change its code at every 
infection. According to Rad et al. (2012), a metamorphic virus is a virus that mutates 
all its body with the help of a mutation engine. 
 Polymorphic Virus: Dhruw et al. (2016) define a polymorphic virus as a virus that 
mutates with every infection in order to make detection by signature impossible. 
According to Kakad et al. (2014), a polymorphic virus is a virus that changes some 
instructions in new generations in order to overcome signature scanning. Joshi & Patil 
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(2012) define a polymorphic virus as a type of virus that uses encryption in order to 
appear differently at every infection thereby avoiding detection.  
 Derived Virus: Based on the definitions of a metamorphic and polymorphic virus 
above, and, for the purposes of this dissertation, we define a derived virus as any virus 
that modifies itself using a mutation engine and evolves to have   a signature that is 
different from its original or predecessor at every infection in order to avoid detection 
by signature scanning.  
 Artificial Intelligence: Banerjee (2015) defines an artificial intelligence as the science 
of automating intelligent behaviours currently achievable by human beings. Pannu 
(2015) defines artificial intelligence as the development of intelligent machines and 
software that can reason, learn and communicate with objects. According to Borana 
(2016),  artificial intelligence is the intelligence exhibited by an artificial entity to solve 
complex problems. Based on the definitions above, and, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, we define artificial intelligence as the development of intelligent systems 
capable of performing tasks that normally require human intelligence. 
 Artificial Neural Network: Also referred to as neural network, Heaton (2011) defines 
a neural network as computerized simulation of an actual biological neural network. 
Sonali & Wankar (2014) define a neural network as an information processing 
paradigm that is inspired by biological nervous system such as brain processes 
information. Banerjee (2015) defines neural networks as biologically inspired systems 
that convert a set of inputs into a set of outputs by a network of neurons.  Based on the 
definitions above, and, for the purposes of this dissertation, we define a neural network 
as an information processing paradigm inspired by the human brain which learns from 
sets of inputs to produce an output. 
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1.9 Overview of Chapters 
This dissertation is structured as follows: 
Chapter two discusses the background to computer viruses, i.e. evolution, anatomy and 
classification. Chapter three provides an overview of current virus detection techniques and a 
review of related literature. Chapter four presents and discusses the proposed model. Chapter 
five highlights and discusses the result of various experiments conducted with the proposed 





 CHAPTER TWO 
 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter positioned our study and reflect on its growing importance and relevance 
to the field of cyber security. Chapter one has set the scene for this chapter to build on. This 
chapter briefly discusses the evolution of computer viruses and reflects on how they have 
evolved since their first appearance. This chapter goes on to discuss the anatomy of a computer 
virus and its classification. Lastly, it also discusses some virus mutation techniques in 
preparation for the next chapter.  
2.2 Evolution of computer viruses 
Over the years, virus writers have used different approaches to create viruses that can replicate 
easily and effectively. Using different approaches, viruses have evolved over the years and are 
becoming more and more difficult to detect. Furthermore, the damage caused by viruses is 
increasing year after year. Early viruses had little impact apart from annoying pop up messages. 
However today’s viruses have a reputation and financial impact. 
The table below summarizes how computer viruses have evolved over the years with a 
description of each virus and the worth of damages caused by some of these viruses. 
Year Virus Name Virus Description 
1974 Wabbit This is also known as Rabbit virus. This virus makes 
multiple copies of itself at a very high speed on a single 
computer until it clogs the computer, reducing performance 
and crashes the computer when a threshold is reached. 
Table 2.1: Evolution of computer viruses (Rajesh et al. 2015) & (Joshi & Patil, 2012)
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1975 Animal This virus asked a number of questions from the user in an 
attempt to guess the type of animal the user was thinking of, 
while the program creates a copy of itself and animal in 
every directory to which the user had access. 
1981 Apple Viruses 1,2,3 These are some of the first viruses in the public domain. 
They were found on Apple 11operating system and spread 
through Texas A & M via pirated computer games. 
1988 Jerusalem This virus is activated every Friday the 13th. It affects both 
.exe and .com files and deletes any program runs on that day. 
1991 Tequila This is the first widespread polymorphic virus found in the 
wild. Tequila changes its appearance at every infection.  
1995 Word Concept This virus spreads only through Microsoft word documents. 
1996 Baza, Laroux and 
Staog 
These are the first set of viruses to infect Windows95 files, 
Excel and Linux respectively. 
1999 Happy99 This virus attaches itself to emails, displays fireworks to hide 
the changes being made and wishes the user a happy new 
year. 
Melissa Melissa executes a macro virus in a document attached to an 
email. Thereafter, it forwards the document to 50 people in 
the user’s outlook address book. This virus also infects other 
word documents and mails them out as attachments. The 
damage caused by this virus is estimated to be $1.1 billion.  
2000 I Love You This virus spread quickly across the globe by sending a copy 
of itself to every address in its host outlook address book. It 
overwrites important files with a copy of itself, marks all 
mp3 files as hidden and downloaded a Trojan horse that 
would steal user names and passwords and send them to the 
virus’s author. The estimated damage caused by this virus is 
$8.75 billion. 
Stages This virus disguised as a joke email about the stages of life 
and spreads fast across internet. 
2001 Anna Kournikova This virus which was written with a virus tool kit copies 
itself to the Windows directory and sends the file as an 
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attachment to all addresses listed in Microsoft Outlook e-
mail address book of its victim. The estimated damage is 
$166,827. 
Nimda Nimda infects hundreds of thousands of computers in the 
world. The virus is one of the most sophisticated viruses with 
as many as five different methods of replicating and 
infecting systems. The estimated damage of this virus is 
$645 million. 
Klez Klez and its variants are considered to be one of the most 
persistence viruses ever. It selects one email address from 
the host’s address book to use as the “from” address, then 
sending the virus to all the other addresses. The estimated 
damage caused by this virus is $18.9 billion. 
2003 SQL Slammer This virus takes advantage of buffer overflow bugs in 
Microsoft’s SQL Server database. It infected 75,000 
computers in approximately 10 minutes and caused damages 
worth $1.2 billion. 
2004 Mydoom This virus spreads through email and file sharing software.  
It slowed overall Internet performance by about 10%, and 
average web page load times by about 50%. The worth of 
damages caused by mydoom virus is $38.5 billion. 
Sasser The sasser virus affected one million computers running 
windows. The virus causes computers to reboot repeatedly 
and the damage caused by this virus is estimated to be $14.8 
billion. 
2008 Conficker This virus infected somewhere between nine and fifteen 
million servers worldwide which include servers of large 
government organizations. It caused damage estimated to be 
$9.1 billion. 
2010 Stuxnet This virus targets Siemens industrial software through 
Microsoft window. 
2012 Flame Flame virus records skype conversations, audio, keyboard 




The table above summarizes how computer viruses have evolved between the year 1974 and 
2012. Computer viruses are almost as old as computers themselves with the first computer 
virus being discovered in the 1970s and yet, it is still one of the major challenges of computing 
devices.  Since then viruses have evolved from being spread through floppy disks to spreading 
through the Internet. Thus, it can be concluded that the evolution of the Internet and computer 
networks also brought about the evolution for computer viruses. This is because viruses spread 
faster and easier through the Internet as compared to when viruses were mostly spread by 
floppy disk.  
The creation of signature scanning techniques for virus detection brought about the evolution 
of morphed viruses. These viruses can create variants with same functionalities but different 
body structure. This was done to prolong the process of analysis and also to make detection 
with signature scanning difficult. Operating systems and application software also brought 
about evolution in viruses as virus writers explore the vulnerabilities in newer versions of 
software to make viruses gain unauthorized access and cause damage on computers. Hence, 
viruses are likely to keep evolving in order to take advantage of the vulnerabilities in new 
software. The next section unveils the life cycle of a computer virus. 
2.3 Computer virus life cycle 
The major characteristic of a computer virus is its self-replication ability. Replication includes 
making a copy of the virus to the infected program. The infected program can then go on to 
infect other programs. In this way a virus can continue to spread to infect more programs. The 
most common computer viruses are parasitic in nature. This means that they work by attaching 
themselves to carrier objects. The carrier object may be a file or other entity that is likely to be 
transmitted to another computer such as an executable program. A virus is attached to its host 
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in such a way that it activates when the host program is executed. Once activated, the virus 
looks for other suitable carrier objects and attaches itself to them. At this point, replication and 
spreading requires little or no human intervention.  
 
The figure above summarizes the life cycle on how a virus move from one carrier to another 
infecting its targets. Having discussed the life cycle of a virus, the next section explores the 
anatomy of a virus.  
2.4 Anatomy of a computer virus 
The virus code has two major parts, i.e. replication and payload routine. The next sub-section 
discusses each of these two parts. 
2.4.1 Replication routine 
The replication routine locates suitable objects and copies the virus to these objects (Dhruw et 
al., 2016). Computer virus sometimes remains in the memory and monitor a system’s activity. 
Figure 2.1: The life cycle of a computer virus (Dhruw et al., 2016)
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This enables a virus to infect files when they are used and spread easily. Instead of searching 
for the carrier files, the virus just scan files as they come through memory. There are several 
ways that viruses use for replication. However, it is common for the virus code to get executed 
when the carrier object is being used. Viruses that infect program files may attach the virus 
code to the beginning or the end of the program file, and patch the entry point so that when the 
program is run the virus code is executed first.  
2.4.2 Payload routine 
The payload of a virus is the part of the software that delivers the malicious code and causes 
the damage to computing devices (Joshi & Patil, 2012). In other words, the payload is the part 
of the code that contains the intended purpose of the virus and the conditions of execution. For 
example, a payload might be the part of the virus code that monitors keyboard to spy on 
passwords and email the password to an anonymous email address (Van der Made, 2003). A 
payload announces the presence of the virus by displaying a pop up message or displaying 
graphics, play music or videos in order to catch user’s attention. The next section discusses the 
various ways in which viruses can be classified.  
2.5 Classification of computer viruses  
Computer viruses can be classified according to their different characteristics. The 
classification may be based on infection mechanism, targeted environment or concealment 
technique (Rad et al., 2011). A virus can either be a resident or non-resident virus when 
classified by infection mechanism. Based on virus classification by targeted environment, a 
virus can be classified as a file infector, boot sector infector, multipartite or macro infector 
(Dhruw et al., 2016). This dissertation is concerned more about derived virus and as such, it 
discusses more on virus classification by concealment technique as compared to the others. 
The next sub-section discusses some of these concealment techniques. 
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2.5.1 Classification by concealment technique  
This is the technique that a virus uses to hide itself in order to avoid detection. The figure below 
shows how computer viruses are classified based on concealment techniques according to 
Singla et al. (2015). 
 
The early viruses were developed without any encryption mechanism that could make their 
detection difficult. Therefore, it was easier for the anti-virus companies to get good detection 
results for the early viruses. Virus writers started to use different techniques to create more 
sophisticated viruses such as encrypted virus, oligomorphic virus, polymorphic and 
metamorphic viruses that would evade detection. The aim was to try and frustrate the effort of 
anti-virus companies. The next sub-sections discuss each of these concealment techniques in 
detail. 
Figure 2.2: Evolution of concealment techniques (Singla et al., 2015)
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2.5.1.1 Encrypted virus 
This is one of the first and easiest methods that virus writers used to hide the functionality of 
virus code. An encrypted virus usually consists of two parts. The first part is a small code that 
encrypts and decrypts. The second part is the encrypted part of the code (Rad et al., 2011). 
According to Edward & Slulason (1990), the major aim of virus writer that writes encrypted 
virus is to have a virus that cannot be easily detected by string matching signature-based virus 
detection mechanisms. The figure below shows the structure of an encrypted virus 
 
The figure above shows the structure of an encrypted virus before and after decryption. The 
body of an encrypted virus which contains the payload is not visible before decryption. It only 
becomes visible after decryption when the virus is ready to execute its payload and infect a 
new target. The first part creates a random encryption key that is used to encrypt the remainder 
of the virus.  When an infected program is invoked, the virus uses the stored random key for 
decryption. When the virus replicates, a different random key is selected. For every instance, 
the virus is encrypted with a different key. Hence, there is no constant bit that identifies an 
encrypted virus (Dhruw et al., 2016).  
Figure 2.3: Structure of an encrypted virus (Rad et al., 2012)
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2.5.1.2 Oligomorphic virus 
Unlike an encrypted virus that uses a decryptor, an Oligomorphic virus randomly picks one 
decryptor from a pool of decryptors to be used in its new variants (Rad et al., 2012). Therefore, 
detection of Oligomorphic viruses with signature scanning is more difficult. 
 
The figure above shows the structure of an Oligomorphic virus with its multiple decryptors. 
Before decryption, the virus body is encrypted. When the virus discovers a new target to infect, 
it choses one of the decryptors and decrypts the virus body with the chosen decryptor after 
which infects. A different decryptor which is selected from the pool of decryptors is used at 
every instance of the virus. 
2.5.1.3 Polymorphic virus 
This type of a virus uses a mutation engine to change its form and develop a different signature 
at every infection. The mutation engine is used to modify some pieces of the virus body code 
(Rad et al., 2011). The modification is done with some mutation techniques such as insertion 
of junk codes or substitution of instructions. This is done to make detection by signature 
Figure 2.4 :  Structure of an Oligomorphic virus (Rad et al., 2012)
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matching difficult. For example, an original signature of a particular polymorphic virus might 
be “881600808826000dcd13cd19". This virus can produce a derivative by adding a No 
Operation (NOP) instruction. A NOP instruction is an assembly language command that does 
nothing (Silva et al., 2015). The NOP instruction is used to allow future modification of code 
without rewriting or recompiling it (Clements, 2014). By adding a NOP instruction to the above 
polymorphic virus code, the signature becomes 
"88160080908826000d9090cd13909090cd19”. This same virus can further produce another 
supposedly “new" virus signature by adding a JUMP instruction. The JUMP instruction 
transfers program execution flow by jumping from one location to the other within the program 
(Kahanwal, 2013). By adding a JUMP instruction to the above polymorphic virus code, the 
signature becomes “eb10908826000deb0f9090cd13909090cd198816008088ebed" 
(Silverman, 2001). This now looks very different from the original signature and detection by 
signature matching becomes difficult.  
2.5.1.4 Metamorphic virus 
Unlike a polymorphic virus that mutates by changing some components of its body, a 
metamorphic virus mutates all of its body. A metamorphic virus has the ability to edit, rewrite 
and recompile its whole virus code to create another variant with a different body but still has 
the same functionality (Ling & Sani, 2017). For example, the signature of a particular 
metamorphic virus before an instruction replacement might be 
“558BEC8B760885F6743B8B7E0C09FF743431D2". The signature becomes 
“55545D8B760809F6743B8B7E0C85FF743428D2" after some instructions replacement. Just 
by making some changes to the instructions, another supposedly “new" virus signature is 
created. According to Ling & Sani (2017), a metamorphic virus contains 80% metamorphic 




As shown in the figure above, a metamorphic engine contains the following parts; a 
disassembler, a code analyser, a code transformer and an assembler. A metamorphic virus 
locates its code after discovering a new host, the code is passed to the mutation engine where 
it is disassembled, analysed, transformed and re-assembled again. Thereafter, the virus attaches 
itself to the new host but now with a different look. Hence, there is no constant signature for a 
metamorphic virus. Having classified computer viruses based on concealment techniques, the 
next section discusses some of the mutation techniques used by modern viruses.  
2.6 Computer Virus Mutation Techniques  
Modern computer viruses use different mutation techniques in order to make their code difficult 
to understand, analyse and in turn avoid detection by coming up with different signatures at 
every infection. The following are some of the mutation techniques used today by many virus 
writers. 
2.6.1 Junk or Dead code insertion 
The insertion of junk code is one of the easiest solutions to modify the binary sequence of a 
virus program. Junk insertion does not affect the functionality and behaviour of the code (Rad 
Figure 2.5: Structure of replicator and mutation engine in metamorphic virus (Rad et al., 2012).
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& Masrom, 2010). These additional instructions do not change the content of CPU registers or 
memory. Hence, they are similar to a NOP instruction. Junk or dead code is also referred to as 
garbage instructions. For example, adding a zero to a variable or a register, or assigning a 
register value to itself, do not have any effect on the results of execution, yet this has effect on 
the virus detection. The tables below show how a particular virus produced two variants using 
junk insertion according to Rad & Masrom (2010). 
      
Binary Opcode        Assembly Code 
C7060F000055         mov [esi], 5500000Fh 
C746048BEC5151   mov[esi+0004],5151EC8Bh 







As seen in the tables above, the two variants have different signatures due to junk codes that 
are inserted in the second version of the virus but both variants perform same operation. Both 
transfer two double words into memory address specified by esi. Hence, there cannot be a 
signature that will identify the above virus and detection with signature scanning will be 
difficult. 
Binary Opcode         Assembly Code 
BF0F000055             mov edi,5500000Fh 
893E                          mov [esi],edi 
5F                              pop edi 
52                              push edx 
B640                         mov dh,40 
BA8BEC5151          mov edx,5151EC8Bh 
53                             push ebx 
8BDA                      mov ebx,edx 
895E04                    mov [esi+0004],ebx 
Signature:   
BF0F000055893E5F52B640BA8BEC5151538BDA895E04 
 
Table 2.2 :  Version 1( Rad & Masrom,  Table 2.3: Version 2(With junk insertion)
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2.6.2 Variable substitution 
The register or memory variables are exchanged in different instances of a virus (Rad et al., 
2012). This method does not change the behaviour of the code but it modifies its binary 
sequence. Hence, making each variant looks different from the former. The tables below show 
register substitution in variants of a particular virus according to Rad & Masrom (2010). 
 
Some register variables in the tables above are substituted which leads to the creation of another 
supposedly “new” virus because they have different signatures which is as a result of the 
variables substitution. For example, register edx on the first line of version 1 has been replaced 
with register eax in version 2. This causes some changes in the binary sequence and produced 
a new signature. Hence, detection with signature scanning will be difficult. 
2.6.3 Instruction replacement 
This method replaces some instructions with their equivalent instruction. This is like solving 
same programming task with different code instruction. This approach could be used to 
produce variants of a particular virus since the opcode pattern changes due to instruction 
Binary Opcode    Assembly Code 
5A                         pop edx 
BF04000000         mov edi,0004h 
8BF5                     mov esi,ebp 
B80C000000         mov eax,000Ch 
81C288000000      add edx,0088h 
8B1A                     mov ebx,[edx] 





Binary Opcode    Assembly Code 
58                          pop eax 
BB04000000         mov ebx,0004h 
8BD5                     mov edx,ebp 
BF0C000000         mov edi,000Ch 
81C088000000      add eax,0088h 
8B30                      mov esi,[eax] 




Table 2.4: Version 1(Rad & Masrom, 2010)         Table 2.5: Version 2 (With variable substitution)
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replacement (Venkatachalam, 2010). Hence, the variants of the virus have different patterns of 
opcode but perform the same functionalities. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show how a particular virus 
produced two variants as shown in Rad & Masrom (2010). 
           Table 2.7: Version 2(With instruction replacement) 
Binary Opcode    Assembly Code 
55                          push ebp 
8BEC                    mov ebp, esp 
8B7608                 mov esi, dword ptr [ebp + 08] 
85F6                     test esi, esi 
743B                    je 401045 
8B7E0C               mov edi, dword ptr [ebp + 0c] 
09FF                    or edi, edi 
7434                     je 401045 




As shown in the two tables above, some instructions are replaced with their equivalent. For 
example, instruction mov ebp, esp is replaced by push esp and instruction test esi, esi is replaced 
with or esi, esi. The instructions replacement changed the opcode pattern. Hence, the variants 
have different signatures and detection with signature scanning becomes difficult. 
2.6.4 Instruction transposition 
In this method, the instructions in the virus code are reordered in a random fashion and control 
flow is adjusted to make it execute in the same order. This is accomplished by providing labels 
for each reorder and then using conditional jump instructions to jump the control to the labels 
(Rad et al., 2012). Thus, the instructions are reordered inside the code without altering the 
control flow. Figure 2.6 shows an example of instruction transposition in a particular virus. 
Binary Opcode    Assembly Code 
55                          push ebp 
54                          push esp 
5D                         pop ebp 
8B7608                 mov esi, dword ptr [ebp + 08] 
09F6                      or esi, esi 
743B                      je 401045 
8B7E0C                 mov edi, dword ptr [ebp + 0c] 
85FF                      test edi, edi 
7434                       je 401045 
28D2                      sub edx, edx 
Signature: 
55545D8B760809F6743B8B7E0C85FF743428D2 





The first part of the figure shows the instructions in order 4, 5, 1, 2, 3. The second part of the 
figure shows the instructions in order 2, 3,5,1,4 and lastly the third part shows the instructions 
in order 3, 4, 5, 1, 2. Although the virus code is reordered, it is important to note that the control 
flow still remain the same. This is achieved by the several jump instructions introduced. A 
close look at the figure shows that control flow execution for the above three virus code is start, 
execute instruction 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Over the years, computer viruses have changed from those that can be easily detected to those 
that replicate and cause unwanted changes within a computer system. Virus writers keep 
coming up with different techniques to make virus detection difficult. It started with encrypted 
virus and is currently on metamorphic virus. It is observed that as computer virus evolves, there 
has been an advancement in the concealment technique used and therefore making the latter 
always more difficult to analyse and detect than the previous. It is difficult for the current virus 
detection methods to detect today’s viruses because by the time they get detected, they would 
have already changed one or more of its components to look different from its predecessors.  
This has contributed to the huge number of viruses available today. 
Figure 2.6 :  Instruction transposition (Rad et al., 2012).
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Amongst other things, the next chapter discusses virus detection techniques that are currently 




        CHAPTER THREE 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed the background of computer viruses, their anatomy, the 
evolution milestones and computer virus classification. Virus code obfuscation techniques 
were also discussed in the previous chapter. 
This chapter provides an overview of the virus detection techniques that are currently in use 
and states their advantages and disadvantages. It then gives a review of research works done 
on virus detection. Ever since the first computer virus was found in the mid-1970s, several 
research works have been conducted to detect and remove virus from infected files and recover 
the files back to their original state. Anti-viruses are used for this purpose. The main functions 
of an anti-virus program are virus detection, file protection, removing virus from infected files 
and recovering damaged files (Mishra, 2010). Previous research works has resulted to the 
development of a variety of anti-virus programs that are currently in use today. The next section 
discusses some of the anti-virus software detection techniques. 
3.2 Current anti-virus software detection techniques 
The major methods used by anti-virus software for virus detection are as follow: signature 
scanning, integrity checker, heuristic scanner, anomaly based detection and CPU emulation 
(Mishra, 2010). In the following section, we discuss each of these techniques.  
3.2.1 Signature Scanning 
Signature scanning is regarded as the oldest and most common virus detection technique which 
is still being used today by many anti-virus software  (Kamarudin et al., 2013). It involves a 
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careful analysis of a particular virus with the aim of detecting a specific string of bytes called 
a virus signature. A virus signature is a unique string of bytes that correctly identifies a 
particular virus (Kamarudin et al., 2013). Virus signatures of the actual viruses are stored in 
the database of an anti-virus program which is then installed on the computer system. The anti-
virus software works by comparing signatures of files in a computer against the signatures of 
viruses that are stored in the anti-virus software database. If a signature of any file matches a 
signature in the installed anti-virus database, such a file is declared infected and necessary 
action is taken whether to delete or quarantine it (Kakad et al., 2014). This method of virus 
detection is effective and gives accurate result but only to known viruses. The disadvantages 
of this method includes but not limited to its inability to detect new viruses and also its inability 
to detect derived viruses (i.e. viruses that use modern techniques to change form in order to 
avoid detection) (Hamza & Hussain, 2014). Another major drawback of signature scanning is 
the time lag between virus creation and detection. This is the amount of time it takes to get the 
signature that can be used to detect a virus after its creation. During this period, a new virus 
can easily spread and cause damage on billions of computing devices without being detected. 
The virus can continue to infect and cause damage for as long as it takes before the signature 
is found.  Figure 3.1 below shows the steps of signature scanning as described by Mishra 
(2010). 
 
Figure 3.1: Steps of signature scanning (Mishra, 2010)
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The figure above shows that to obtain signature for a new virus, the virus must have infected 
some files and that is where the steps to finding a virus signature begins. The infected file is 
analysed carefully in order to get the string of bytes (signature) that will correctly identifies the 
virus. When the signature is found, the anti-virus company distribute the newly found virus 
signature to their customers by uploading it to their central database. Each customer is expected 
to download the new virus signature by connecting to the anti-virus central database and 
download updates to the virus signature database on user computer. Thereafter, customers scan 
files on their computer for the newly found virus pattern. 
3.2.2 Integrity Checker 
An integrity checker keeps a small hash value or fingerprint of uninfected programs and files 
in a secured location at the beginning when a system is presumed to be clean from virus 
infections. It then detects the presence of a virus by comparing the hash value of a file with the 
hash value of its clean version. If there is no difference between the two hash values then the 
file is deemed to be clean. Otherwise, if the two hash values are different, then the file is 
considered to be infected. This method works on the basis that it is impossible for a virus not 
to make any change to its host program or file. Integrity checker can detect any type of virus. 
This could include new, unknown and even derived viruses. One of the major drawbacks of 
integrity checker is that when a change in a file or program is detected, it is often difficult to 
determine whether the change was induced by a virus or by a user changing the file. Hence, 
false positive is possible with this method. Another drawback of an integrity checker is its 
ineffectiveness if the computer has already been infected at the time when the program hash 




As shown in the figure above, the fingerprint or hash value of an application is created and 
stored in a secret location when the system is assumed to be uninfected. Before the application 
executes, its fingerprint is checked again and it is compared with the stored fingerprint. If the 
two fingerprints match then the application is not infected. Otherwise, if the two fingerprints 
do not match, the application is restored before it runs. 
3.2.3 Heuristic Scanner 
A heuristic scanner anti-virus program examines a target program and analyses its code to 
determine if it appears to be like a virus. A heuristic engine detects the commands within a 
program that are not typically found in normal application programs. This may include 
replication commands that are normally associated with viruses. This approach is relatively 
fast. However, heuristic scanners must look for a large number of different ways which virus-
like operations may be implemented in order to reliably detect a malicious behaviour. This is 
because viruses may open files by using different codes and methods (Mishra, 2010).  
3.2.4 Anomaly based detection 
Anomaly is defined as something that is not normal. Anomaly based detection monitors the 
processes or activities on a host machine for any abnormal activity (Kakad et al., 2014). This 
could be activities that attempt to reformat a disk or move a file into one of the operating system 
folder which is generally not the activity of a normal program. If any such activity is found, 
Figure 3.2 :  Steps of an integrity checker (Mishra, 2010)
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the system flags for a potential threat. This method is capable of detecting new and derived 
viruses. However, false positive is possible with this approach (Kakad et al., 2014).  
3.2.5 CPU / Code Emulation  
This is an emulation based technology that loads a target program into a CPU emulator. The 
CPU emulator acts as a simulated virtual computer. As the target program is emulated, its 
malicious operations are identified and catalogued. An anti-virus software is used to determine 
if the target program is a virus or not from the catalogue of malicious operations. This method 
can detect new and derived viruses. However, this method is ineffective for viruses that activate 
only when a certain arbitrary conditions are met (Mishra, 2010). For example, a logic bomb 
that is programmed to execute on a particular date, if the condition is not met, a CPU emulator 
will not observe the infectious behaviour. Hence, a virus can go undetected. 
In summary, the observation is that within the field of anti-virus, there is an increasing number 
of viruses released daily. These have really stretched the traditional virus detection techniques. 
This has increased the demand for techniques that identify new and derived viruses. The 
ineffectiveness of the signature based scanning method for detecting new and derived viruses 
call for an immediate solution. Some of the above detection methods listed above can handle 
this, but they are still far from perfection. 
The next section reviews previous research works. 
3.3 Review on previous research works 
Several research works have already been conducted to find solutions to the problem of virus 
detection. These are discussed below. Some of these research findings are based on providing 
a solution to derived viruses while some are based on detecting new viruses. A new virus is a 
virus that is created from scratch with a new mechanism that has never been seen before. A 
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derived virus is any virus that modifies itself using a mutation engine and come up with a 
signature different from its original or predecessor at every infection in order to avoid detection 
by signature scanning. 
3.3.1 Research works for detecting new computing viruses 
A method of virus detection based on immune theory and N-Gram analysis was proposed by 
Qin et al. (2009). Qin et al. (2009) uses N-Gram to extract the common features of known virus 
programs. This approach is used on the assumption that viruses have certain characteristics in 
common. The most frequent N-Gram is used as gene library. Immature cells are generated from 
the gene library and some are generated randomly. The immature and randomly generated 
detector experience a self-tolerance period. Any detector that matches any self antigen is 
eliminated (negative selection). The immature detectors that survive maturity are activated if 
viruses are detected. The activated detectors are transferred into memory so that they can 
quickly fight a virus if it re-surfaces. The detectors that are not activated are eliminated. This 
research work does not show how new detectors are generated. Hence, continuity of the 
immune system might be a problem. 
An approach of virus detection that uses a high speed time delay neural networks was proposed 
by El-Bakry (2010). Neural networks are first trained in time domain to classify virus from 
non-virus. In the virus detection phase, each sub-matrix in the incoming data is tested for the 
presence or absence of a virus. At each position in the incoming input matrix, each sub-matrix 
is multiplied by a window of weights. The outputs of neurons in the hidden layer are multiplied 
by the weights of the output layer. If the final output is high, it means that the sub-matrix under 
test contains a virus. There is no experiment to show how the proposed method really works. 
Therefore, its efficiency and accuracy cannot be determined. 
32 
 
Zolkipli & Jantan (2010a) discusses a framework for malware detection using a combination 
of techniques i.e. signature based and genetic algorithm. The framework uses signature based 
technique as first defence for malware attack. The genetic algorithm is then used to select 
chromosomes from the signature based on selective value from the population. New 
chromosomes are produced according to the combination of the bit string from existing 
chromosomes in the existing population. Finally, the signature generator captures the malware 
behaviour and analyse the gene using genetic algorithm detection module. This is to generate 
the signature pattern and update it into malware. There is no experiment that shows how the 
framework works. Therefore, its efficiency cannot be guaranteed. 
Yunlong et al. (2012) propose malicious code detection based on least square estimation. This 
method provides a pre-processing approach that sequences virus behaviour based on time 
correlation and subject-object orientation. Yunlong et al. (2012) proposes a threat judging 
method based on least-square estimation. An expert experience approach is used to introduce 
the code detection and then simulate experts to judge the threat values of malicious code. This 
approach can be used to complement the current antivirus software. However, training the 
experts might be a challenge. It was stated that this research is 87% accurate in detecting 
malware. 
Han et al. (2012) propose a method of detecting malicious or illegal code by monitoring task 
behaviour of software applications. The top-down calling sequence of software applications 
within a computer is developed into a behaviour resource tree. When a user runs an application, 
if the calling sequence of the task deviates from the sequence in the behaviour resource tree, it 
is declared as illegal. Han et al. (2012) also came up with illegal code judgement rule based on 
known behaviours of malicious code. The challenge of this method is how to build behaviour 
resource tree for new application software. Moreover, legal activities such as a user updating 
software can cause false positive. Furthermore, one other disadvantage of rule based systems 
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is that the system is as good as the defined rules. Anything that falls outside or deviates from 
the stated rules cannot be picked. 
Multiple sequence alignment and an artificial neural network for malicious software detection 
were proposed by Chen et al. (2012). Chen et al. (2012) uses multiple sequence alignment 
techniques from bioinformatics to align variable length computer viral and worm code. An 
artificial neural network is then used to learn the critical features to determine the class of the 
aligned patterns. The algorithm for alignment involves some sort of gap insertion. However, 
there is no guarantee that the same number of gap insertions is made thereby making length of 
virus set alignment different from worms set alignment. An approach that does not require gap 
insertion is needed for the result to be trusted. This experiment was reported to be 88.89% 
accurate if the viral sequences are doubly aligned. 
A multi-component feature for detecting malware by classifying portable executable file as 
benign or malware is proposed by Vinod et al. (2013). The multi-component feature comprises 
of portable executable metadata, principal instruction code, mnemonic bi-gram and prominent 
unigrams. Portable executable of malicious programs is first unpacked using generic 
unpackers. Unpacked samples are disassembled using a disassembler which generates 
assembly code. A parser is then developed to filter out mnemonics from assembly files. These 
processed files are used to extract prominent unigrams and bi-grams. This header information 
is filtered out from each malware and benign executable. The extracted features are used to 
generate multi-component feature. A multi-component feature is used to create a feature vector 
table. The table is used to construct a classification model for malware and benign family. The 
performance of classification model is evaluated by monitoring the evaluation metrics. The 
accuracy of this proposed model in percentile is not stated. However, Vinod et al. (2013) said 
that the proposed model performs better than some other model that exist in literature. 
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Khorsand & Hamzeh (2013) propose an idea of detecting malware by using portable executable 
(PE) header to train prediction by partial matching (PPE) model. PE file is a format of 
executable binaries that the windows operating system uses. PPE is a model that keeps frequent 
occurrence of symbols. Its encoder encodes each input symbol with probability provided by its 
map. PPE is trained by using the header of programs and strings in the body of the program. 
The experiment shown in this work uses small subset of binary content of files for modelling. 
Since, it is generally known that malware is made up of both malicious and benign code, using 
a small subset of binary content might decrease the effectiveness of the model. 
A computer virus detection system based on an artificial immunity concept was proposed by 
Hamza & Hussain (2014). The system uses an algorithm that was developed based on clonal 
selection in an artificial immune system. The algorithm uses a set of downloaded virus 
signature to create virus clones and infects some already benign files with virus clones. This 
approach then uses various files to test the algorithm for virus identification and elimination. 
The algorithm shows how virus clones can be created and the created clones are used as 
prediction of future viruses. However, the algorithm does not show how virus can be detected. 
An average of 95% of detection rate was reported for this experiment. It must be mentioned 
that Hamza & Hussain (2014) did not specify if this include existing, derived or new viruses. 
A method of detecting derivative malware samples using de-obfuscation-assisted similarity 
analysis is proposed by Wrench & Irwin (2015). The method uses a decoder developed to de-
obfuscate and normalise code prior to analysis. The first part is achieved by using a decode 
function in php. This function scans the entire code for functions that obfuscate a segment of 
code. If any is found, it is processed and the normal code is extracted and replace what it 
represents. Thereafter, code normalisation is done. After de-obfuscation, both extracted and 
raw data are passed to a matrix module to produce matrices that represent the observed 
similarity between all given samples based on specified measure of similarity. The 
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disadvantage of this system is that a virus written in any other language other than PHP cannot 
be detected. This is because the system scans for only php functions that obfuscate a segment 
of code. 
A Neural Network Artificial Immune System for malicious code detection was proposed by 
Golovko & Bezobrazov (2015). The system uses a combination of Artificial Immune System 
and Artificial Neural Networks concepts. It works according to basic principles of the artificial 
immune system whereby a neural network is used as the immune detector to detect a malicious 
pattern by means of the analysis and structure of the executable code. The trained neural 
networks are then accepted as part of the Artificial Immune System component. The work of 
the neural network detector is to randomly scan the files and classify them as legitimate or 
malicious. If a detector is able to pick a malware, then cloning and mutation will occur on the 
detector that detects the malware. This is to be able to quickly fight the malware and have the 
detector registered in the memory in case the same malware shows up again. The idea of 
combining an artificial immune system and artificial neural network sounds great. However, it 
is stated that an increase in the number of malware leads to decrease detection rate. Also, the 
neural network used requires a unique node in the hidden layer for all inputs. This is often too 
large to work on real world problems. Even though the accuracy of the system was not stated, 
it was reported that the system performed better and more accurate than some of the current 
antivirus programs in use. 
Andree & Nhien-An (2016) uses statistical methods, Naïve-Bayes algorithm and N-grams to 
find out if there is significant data that could be used to classify malware in control flow change. 
In order to find a discriminator between a malware and good software, Andree & Nhien-An 
(2016) first calculate and compare statistical values of the median, variance, variance 
coefficient and spread for both malware and good software. The second approach used by 
Andree & Nhien-An (2016) to find a discriminator is a Naïve-Bayes classifier. The classifier 
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is first trained with sample datasets comprising of raw jump length data for both malware and 
good software. Thereafter, the classifier test unknown software against the data that has been 
learned by the classifier. The third approach used by the authors is based on the extraction on 
N-grams of words from a text. The N-grams of sample datasets are extracted and saved to a 
database for further comparison. Test samples are processed the same way the sample datasets 
are processed and saved into another database. The categorization test searches for occurrence 
of the to-test n-grams in the sample datasets and check for similarities. The data found in this 
work is not usable and its likelihood is too low to make a decision. 
A combination of an artificial neural network and artificial immune system for virus detection 
was also proposed by Khang et al. (2016). This research describes three main components for 
the proposed model. The first component called the training data consists of a set of viral and 
benign files used for training and detecting stage. The second component is the population of 
detectors called antibodies. These are the ANN that are trained with the first component of the 
model and are used as detectors for recognizing malicious and benign files. The third 
component is the artificial immune network (Ainet) which is used for generating mature 
detectors. The proposed model results into set of ANN that can be used as computer virus 
detector. An average detection rate of 87.98% with an acceptable false positive rate was 
reported for this work. However, Khang et al. (2016) did not specify if the detection rate 
includes existing, derived or new viruses. 
The next sub-section reviews research work that has been done for detecting derived viruses. 
3.3.2 Research work for detecting derived computing viruses 
A method of detecting virus mutations via dynamic matching was proposed by Feng & Gupta 
(2009). The research work is based on the fact that virus developers do not often write new 
codes in creating newer virus. Rather, the code of an existing virus is altered in such a way that 
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the behaviour remains the same but the flow of the code differs. This makes it difficult for a 
signature to detect the supposedly ‘new’ variants. In their work, the behaviours of a virus are 
studied using CPU emulator and saved in a database during runtime. The database continues 
to grow based on the behaviours of viruses at run time. When a new virus is encountered, it is 
checked to see if it has behaviour similar to any in the database. If it does, then it will be 
confirmed as the mutated version of a virus that has been encountered before. The idea is good 
but since a CPU emulator is used, it will be difficult to get the behaviours of viruses that are to 
be executed based on some conditions. It was stated that the experiments performed showed 
that their work is effective in detecting the variants of six viruses out of seven viruses used for 
the experiment. 
Daoud (2009) propose a model for detecting metamorphic viruses based on Artificial Immune 
System. The model uses three different layers of defence to detect a virus by imitating the 
human immune system. This model defines what self and non-self means at each layer. 
Moreover, an algorithm is developed for each layer based on the self and non-self idea.  At the 
first layer, self is the hash of all trusted files and non-self is the hash strings of known viruses. 
The algorithm in this layer serves as the entry point to the computer files. The hash value of 
the file is calculated, if the value matches one of the self hash strings, then the file is clean. If 
the hash string matches one of the non-self then it is an infected file. Otherwise, the file is sent 
to the second layer to perform additional checks. At the second layer, self is the trained neural 
network on the flow graph of safe assembly codes. Non-self is the trained neural network on 
the flow graph of virus assembly codes. The algorithm on this layer disassembles the file, 
encodes the data and represents the flow graph by two dimensional matrix. If the result of the 
file sent from layer one is similar to self flow graph then the file is clean. If the result is similar 
to non-self flow graph, then the file is infected. Otherwise, the file is sent to the third layer to 
perform additional checks. At the third layer, self is the trained neural network on the receptor 
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data of safe assembly codes. The non-self is a trained neural network on the receptors data of 
the viruses’ assembly codes. If the encoded data is similar to three of the self receptors, then 
the file is clean. If the encoded data is similar to three of the non-self, then, the file is infected. 
The disadvantage of this system is that it can produce high false positive and false negative if 
the computer files are infected before the hash string is first computed. Furthermore, the system 
still requires self and non-self updates for new files and viruses respectively. This experiment 
reported 86% detection rate of metamorphic virus. 
An approach was proposed by Wang et al. (2009) which involves characterization of the 
generation of virus detectors under supervision. This approach collects correlation of 
instructions within a virus program. This approach is based on an Artificial Immune System 
model which uses a training set as a guide to generate a candidate virus gene library. The gene 
library is then upgraded to a virus detection gene library. It does this by deleting all the non-
viral information with negative selection in artificial immunity. This allows legal programs in 
the training set to be memorized. The model then compares genes on a gene level (DNA), 
analyse suspicious program on individual level and make classification decision by using the 
entire gene library. It is stated that the drawback of the model is its inability to maintain or 
increase the diversity of the genes in the virus library. An average recognition rate of 94% for 
derived virus was reported for this experiment. 
Zolkipli & Jantan (2010b) proposes a framework for malware identification and classification. 
The proposed framework therein consists of two activities which are behaviour identification 
and malware classification. Samples of malware are run in a windows virtual machine 
environment. This is to understand the characteristics and behaviour of the malware and also 
to know its purpose and function. The defined malware behaviour for each sample is used for 
malware classification. Related classification techniques are applied for identifying the shared 
behaviour of each malware family. The classification process is also optimized by using an 
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artificial intelligent technique. However, it should be stated that this framework has not been 
implemented and its accuracy is not stated. 
A dynamic approach using signatures from an API for detecting metamorphic malware is 
proposed by Vinod et al. (2010). The API calls made by a family of malware is used to form 
matrix. A principal component analysis is used to extract the most significant API calls called 
critical API calls. The frequency of the critical API calls is used to create a family signature for 
each malware family. The signature is saved in the database. To test if a particular malware 
belongs to one of the known malware family; the API calls of the signature are extracted and 
compared to that in the database. It is reported that the results from the experiments performed 
are in accordance with some other result in literature. 
A neural network ensembly method for detecting computer viruses was proposed by Liu et al. 
(2010). The research work discusses how machine learning could be used for virus detection. 
The characteristics of a virus are first extracted for classification learning through the system 
calling sequence of a program. Different machine learning approaches are then used to 
construct the ensemble. The results of the machine learning are combined according to 
Dempster Shafers evidence theory to form the final output of the system. This research work 
only discusses how an artificial neural network can be trained but does not show how the output 
of the trained artificial neural network detects a computer virus. However, an astounding 97% 
accuracy was reported for this work when compared with other traditional ways. It must be 
mentioned though that Liu et al. (2010) did not specify if this include derived or new viruses. 
Vinod et al. (2012) proposes a method of detecting variants of metamorphic malware using 
bioinformatics techniques effectively used for Protein and DNA matching. In their proposed 
method, multiple sequence alignment is used to arrange opcode sequence of malware. This is 
to determine similarity among malware samples and also to determine frequent occurring 
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pattern in a malware family. The frequent pattern depicts maliciousness. It is reported that the 
result of the experiments is comparable with some of the anti-virus software that are commonly 
in use today. 
A memory-based abstraction approach to handle obfuscation in a polymorphic virus was 
proposed by Nguyen et al. (2012). The aim of this research work is to handle obfuscation in 
polymorphic virus. The methodology involves abstracting the binary code based on their 
memory states and analyse the abstracted states to detect useless instructions. This method is 
proposed because in spite of any obfuscation technique employed, the actual malicious code, 
once executed produces the same memory state patterns when properly abstracted. However, 
the major challenge of this approach is the need to develop an abstract form that captures the 
memory states affected by each instruction when executed. As such, it is stated that the 
approach is not practically possible because of the high complexity. 
Zhong et al. (2012) proposes a malware classification method based on similarity of function 
structure to determine a program as a variant of a known malware program. In their approach, 
programs are characterized according to the functions they contain. Functions are characterized 
based on their features. A database is developed based on the extracted features of the known 
malware. Unknown programs are tested against the data in the database created as mentioned 
above to determine the family that they belong to. When given an unknown program, it is 
disassembled, divided into functions, and their binary, strings and lists of called APIs are 
obtained through the same process described above. This work is reported to have virus variants 
detection rate of 78%. 
Kamarudin et al. (2013) conducted an analysis on the effectiveness of signature based anti-
virus software in detecting metamorphic viruses. In their work, Kamarudin et al. (2013) created 
a seed virus using a virus generator. Thereafter, the seed virus is run on their morphine engine 
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which contains some code obfuscation techniques. This process is done to generate a family of 
metamorphic variants for the seed virus and it was conducted 20 times which gives 20 
metamorphic variants of the seed virus with each generated variant different from one another. 
This explains the reason why detection of metamorphic virus is difficult with signature based 
anti-virus software. Kamarudin et al. (2013) also performed a similarity test on 4 generations 
of metamorphic variants and the original seed. It was discovered that the similarity decreases 
with higher generations. The first generation virus is similar to the virus seed with about 60% 
and the fourth generation virus has an average similarity of 19.7% with the virus seed. 
A model to classify files into malware or benign was developed by Kuriakose & Vinod 
(2014b). They use feature selection methods such as term frequency, inverse document 
frequency among others to develop the model. Malware and benign portable executables are 
unpacked and disassembled to get bi-gram data set. The bi-gram dataset is used for training 
and testing. The experiment shows that the model can detect more synthetic metamorphic 
viruses with average detection rate of 92%. 
Gang & Zhongquan (2014) developed a malicious code detection solution that is based on 
fuzzy reasoning. The research work adopts a comprehensive scheme to get behaviours in such 
phases as file structure analysis and function call identification. It also analyses the most 
common obfuscation technique that insert data after call instruction and provide an algorithm 
that identifies information calls. A dynamic fuzzy neural network decision system is then used 
in order to determine mutating and unknown malicious executable viruses. The system does 
not show how viruses are detected. However, 95.2% detection accuracy was reported for this 
work’s experiment. 
Kuriakose & Vinod (2014a) proposes a non-signature based approach using feature selection 
technique for the detection of metamorphic viruses. A classification model for identifying viral 
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and benign samples is developed from the proposed model. The metamorphic samples are 
unpacked and disassembled. Thereafter, bi-gram mnemonics are extracted from each file based 
on prior studies. Relevant bigram mnemonics are selected from the total bigram feature space. 
The obtained feature space is further pruned using the feature ranking method such as 
Categorical Proportional Distance (CPD), Weight of Evidence of Text (WET), Term 
Frequency – Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) and Term Frequency-Inverse Document 
Frequency. 
3.4 Research Gaps 
The review presented in this chapter shows that a virus detection techniques based on signature 
characterisation is the oldest and most commonly used technique (Kamarudin et al., 2013) and 
has  many disadvantages such as human intervention in signature extraction, the need for users 
to regularly update the signature database (Vinod et al., 2010), the time lag between virus 
creation and detection and most importantly, the inability to detect new and derived viruses 
(Mishra, 2010). Some other approaches that use behaviour to detect the presence of a virus 
have high false positives while some are still far from perfection. Some of the methods 
proposed in the literature involve some error prone pre-processing and some of these are too 
complex to implement. Another approach that sounds promising might be to use the concept 
of artificial immune systems to enhance computing devices with their own immune system. 
However, training on how to differentiate non-viral files from viral files seems to be a big 
challenge. This is important in a computing system where application software is installed and 
uninstalled on a regular basis. Some research explored the use of artificial intelligence in 
detecting computing viruses but more research still needs to be done in order to fully explore 
more of the available branches of artificial intelligence. Furthermore, very few research efforts 
focused on detection of derived viruses and the ones that do considered metamorphic viruses 
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rather than considering detection of all variants of existing viruses irrespective of the type of 
variant it is. These are the challenges faced by the current virus detection techniques and also 
the techniques that are proposed in literature. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The review shows that more emphasis needs to be laid on the detection of derived viruses. This 
is because the major challenge of virus detection is the ability of the virus to change its form 
by using any of the modern techniques in order to avoid being detected by most of the current 
available anti-virus software. The review also shows that artificial intelligence in the form of 
artificial neural networks still needs to be explored further. Therefore, this research focuses on 
investigating how artificial intelligence in the form of artificial neural networks might be used 
to increase the detection rate of derived viruses.  




 PROPOSED MODEL 
4.1 Introduction 
In view of the current problems of detecting derived viruses as identified in the previous 
chapter, there is a need for a better solution. The solution should be dynamic in nature and not 
dependent on pre-defined virus signatures. The solution should also learn from existing virus 
signatures and be able to predict and detect derived viruses thereof. Hence, a model is proposed 
base on these requirements.  
4.2 Model 
The model is as shown in figure 4.1. The proposed model comprises of various building blocks 
depicting different processes. The next sub-section discusses the processes in each block. 
4.2.1 Virus signature database 
This is the first block of the model. This block generates the dataset using the following steps: 
4.2.1.1 Existing/known virus signatures 
The first step in building a virus signature database is to obtain existing virus signatures. The 
existing virus signatures can be obtained from any source such as VX Heaven and nlnetlabs 
website. However for this particular research, the signatures were obtained from nlnetlabs 
website. The size of a single signature string can vary (Wang, 2008). This experiment considers 
virus signatures of 32 bytes, this is because our solution requires the input to be represented as 
a fixed-length feature vector. The sample of existing virus signatures downloaded is as shown 








Figure 4.2: Existing virus signatures sample 
4.2.1.2 Derive virus signatures 
This is the second step of this block. A mutation engine is built and used here to generate derive 
virus signatures.  This is achieved by combining sets of known virus signatures based on a pre-
determined algorithm. The aim here is to simulate a derived virus signature using existing virus 
signatures and train the neural network with it. This is necessary since this research aims to 
train a neural network to be able to detect derived viruses based on the existing viruses. For 
example, given a group of existing virus signatures, we can generate a number of signatures. 
Derived virus signatures are generated up until the third generation using the built mutation 
engine. The process starts by arranging known virus signatures into groups based on their 
similarities. Each group can be argued to be a particular virus family consisting of related 
viruses. The virus signatures in a family are randomly combined to produce a derived virus 
signature for that family. The first derived signature is then added to the family. Thereafter, 
another randomization is conducted again on both the existing signatures and the newly 
generated derivative. This process is repeated until three new derivatives are generated. The 
same process is repeated for all the groups (families). For example, a family which originally 
has three virus signatures, the fourth signature for that family is generated by random 
combination of the three existing virus signatures. The newly created derive virus signature is 
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added to the family and the family now consist four virus signatures. The fifth signature for 
that family is generated by random combination of the four virus signatures. The newly created 
derive virus signature is added to the family and the family now has five virus signatures. 
Lastly, the sixth signature for that family is generated by random combination of the five virus 
signatures. The newly created derive virus signature is added to the family and the family now 
has six virus signatures. All this is done by the mutation engine. Using this approach, the 
mutation engine was able to generate new virus derivatives of three generations grouped into 
a number of families. 
4.2.2 Conversion of the virus signatures 
The second block of the model is to convert the signatures obtained in stage 1 above from their 
strings representation to decimals forms. This is achieved with a pre-defined algorithm that 
converts string to decimal. This is necessary since neural networks are designed to accept 
numbers as their input (Heaton, 2011). It is also possible to represent the signatures in other 
numerical formats like binary and ASCII. However, this might introduce more complexity. For 
example, binary representation of each signature might generate lots of 0’s and 1’s which might 
not be easy to manage. For example, the first four characters of this signature 
“b840008ed8a11300b106d3e02d00088e” gives “0110001000111000 0011010000110000” in 
binary. Furthermore, ASCII representation might not be necessary since we have chosen to 




The output from the block above is the signatures written in a decimal form. This is normalized 
to improve the efficiency of the model. There are two different categories of data entering the 
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neural network for training. First is the numeric data and the other is the class each numeric 
input belongs. This two categories need to be normalized. 
4.2.3.1 Normalizing signatures  
Normalizing a numeric value is a process of mapping the existing numeric value to well-
defined numeric range, such as -1 to +1 or 0 to +1. Normalization causes all of the attributes to 
be in the same range with no one attribute more powerful than the others (Heaton, 2011). Each 
virus signature used has 32 bytes and each of this is an attribute in which the neural network 
learns from. All virus signatures in decimal are normalized to values between +1 and -1 using 
the normalization formula below. This is because hyperbolic tangent activation function is used 
to scale the output.  
𝐹(𝑥) =
(𝑥 − 𝑑𝐿) (𝑛𝐻 − 𝑛𝐿)
(𝑑𝐻 − 𝑑𝐿) + 𝑛𝐿
 
The above equation normalizes a value x, where the variable dH represents the high value of 
the data, variable dL represents the low value of the data and the variable n represents the high 
and low normalization range desired i.e. -1 and +1. 
4.2.3.2 Normalizing the classes 
This is otherwise known as encoding because it is basically a way of representing nominal 
values. The nominal values here are existing signatures and derived signatures which are the 
two classes into which a signature can be grouped. One-of-n encoding is used here. This is 
because there are just two nominal classes to encode. Therefore, with one-of-n encoding, the 
neural network has two output neurons. Each of these two neurons represents each class 
(derived and existing virus signatures). A one (1) is assigned to a neuron that corresponds to 
the input signature and a zero (0) to the second neuron. So existing virus signature is encoded 
as one and zero (1, 0) and similarly a derived virus signature is encoded as zero and one (0, 1). 
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Thus an output value of (1, 0) assigned to a particular input means the input is an existing virus 
signature. Likewise, an output value of (0, 1) assigned to a particular input means the input is 
a derived virus signature. The output neuron with the highest activation is the class predicted 
by the neural network. 
4.2.4 Neural network training 
A neural network is trained and used as the virus detector. A supervised multilayer feed-
forward neural network is used for this research. This is because a multilayer feed-forward 
neural network can learn a mapping of any complexity. The neural network being supervised 
means each input during the training is matched to its corresponding output which the neural 
network learns from. The network learning is based on repeated presentation of training 
samples. Multilayer perceptrons are feed-forward networks with one or more nodes between 
the input and output layer. The layer between the input and output layer is called hidden layer. 
Scaled conjugate gradient back-propagation is used because feed-forward neural network is 
often trained with the error back propagation training algorithm. The back propagation 
algorithm is an iterative process in which an output error signal is propagated back through the 
network and is used to modify weight values so that the current least mean square classification 
error is reduced. The figure below shows a multilayer feed-forward neural network. 
 
Figure 4.3: A multilayer neural network (Zainal-Mokhtar & Mohamad-Saleh, 2013) 
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The above figure shows how training is done in a multilayer neural network. The first layer is 
the input layer which accepts data (x1, x2…xn) into the neural network and it is linked directly 
to the hidden layer. The hidden layer lies between the input layer and the output layer. The 
output layer is the last layer. This layer gives the neural network predicted output to the external 
party where it is needed for further processes or decision. Each node in the input layer has value 
for every input (x1, x2…xn). The neural network initially assigns weights (w11, w21…w4n) to each 
connection. Each input is multiplied by its corresponding weight and the result of each 
connection is summed together and passed to the hidden layer nodes (h1, h2, h3…hn). A 
hyperbolic tangent activation (∫) function is used to scale the result and the final value becomes 
the value for the node the connections entered. This calculation is also performed on the nodes 
in the hidden layer using the values that entered the hidden layer nodes and the assigned weights 
(w211…w2m4) and result is sent to the output layer (y1, ym). The neural network checks its 
predicted output against the desired output; error is calculated by subtracting the desired output 
from the predicted output. The weights are adjusted based on the error and the iteration 
continues until the error becomes very small or insignificant. 
4.2.5 Neural network testing 
The performance of neural networks is determined by their generalization ability. 
Generalization is the property of trained neural networks to classify an input correctly even if 
it is not a member of the training set ( Urolagin et al., 2011). This is what block five of this 
model does. New samples that are not part of the training dataset are given to the trained neural 
network for classification. A correct classification of the hidden samples means such a network 
has learned. Incorrect classification means otherwise.  
Finally, the trained neural network is used as a virus detector especially for derived viruses. 




The training dataset consist of both existing and derived virus signatures. As earlier mentioned, 
the existing virus signatures were obtained from nlnetlabs website. The website contains virus 
signatures of various lengths. The obtained virus signatures were carefully examined and 
signatures with 32 bytes seem to be common more than any other bytes. Therefore, this 
research considers only virus signatures with 32 bytes. The derived virus signatures used were 
the output of the mutation engine. The mutation engine randomly combined the existing virus 
signatures as discussed earlier. The next section discusses the implementation of the model. 
4.4 Model Implementation 
The part of the model that was implemented first is the mutation engine. The mutation engine 
was developed with console C# in Microsoft visual studio 2013. The Microsoft visual studio 
runs on a 2.60GHz Intel core i5 PC with 4GB of memory and 64 bit OS running windows 8.1 
professional. The mutation engine picks its data from a database that contains raw signatures 
of existing viruses and randomly combines the signatures to produce derived virus signatures. 
Furthermore, it converts both the existing and derived virus signatures to decimal and save 
them to another database accordingly. 
The neural network training is the model part that was implemented secondly. The training is 
done with Matlab 2014 neural network pattern recognition tool (nprtool). Nprtool is a 
multilayer feed-forward neural network tool used to create and train a neural network for 
pattern recognition. The nprtool runs on a computer with same configuration as specified 
above. Training data was divided into three, 70% was for training, 15% for validation and 15% 
for testing the neural network. The neural network has 32 inputs, that is the bytes of virus 
signatures in use as each byte represents a feature and two outputs which are the classes. 
Parameter such as the number of hidden layers were varied a couple of times in order to get a 
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neural network that best solves the problem of classifying any given virus signature into 
derived or existing signature. Training automatically stops when generalization stops 
improving, as indicated by an increase in the mean square error of the validation samples. This 
is done to avoid overfitting. Overfitting is a condition that arises when a neural network has 
mastered its training data. This is bad because it makes the neural network to have poor 
performance on new data. The program code for the neural network training is then written as 
a function and deployed using Matlab deploy tool. This created a class library (.dll) for the 
trained neural network. The created trained neural network library is used for the final part of 
the model. 
The last part of the model is implemented with visual C# using Microsoft visual studio 2013. 
The Microsoft visual studio runs on a PC with same configuration as the mutation engine. The 
trained neural network library is used as the classifier in the C# program code. This last part 
reads a database that contains virus signatures; send the signatures to the trained neural network 
and the neural network based on the training predicts whether the signatures are existing or 
derived virus signatures.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter gives a full detail of the model as proposed base on requirements. The model has 
learnt successfully from both existing and derived virus signatures presented to it during 
training. Hence, it can now classify any given virus signature into existing or derived. 
The next chapter discusses the result of the experiments conducted with the model.
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the proposed model for computer virus detection. The model 
uses a mutation engine to create derivate of existing virus signatures and uses a trained neural 
network as detector within a computer system. 
This chapter presents and discusses the result of the experiments conducted with the model. 
The training data are first presented to the model for classification. Thereafter, the mutation 
engine created new derived virus signatures, these new virus signatures are presented to the 
model to classify and the results are shown and discussed. 
5.2 Mutation engine output 
The mutation engine was given a number of existing virus signatures. These signatures were 
grouped by the mutation engine based on similarities. Thereafter, three variants each are 
created for all the groups as discussed in the previous chapter. The table below shows what the 
mutation engine output looks like. 
Name Signature Name Signature 
8-Tunes1 0fe0cd213d314c753d2e813e2b004d5a Italian –D1 72225002000e2f20e00f70200ca0005c 
8-Tunes2  33f6b9da03f3a550bb230353cb8ed0bc Italian –D2  0d7260d5c08a2c26c0200bd27a3b67c6 
8-Tunes -D1  53e53bda339503e55d21c3e069e5530d Italian –D3  c0007000000580b20ebeee042fce7007 
8-Tunes -D2  5e8f65e135def133313c93eee3083383 403 (B) 342e892603012e8c1605012ea307018d 
8-Tunes -D3 e0030db38d503311d3a155bb33e0d505 403 (A) 2135cd21891e59018c065b018cc88ed8 
Italian-#1 ec020e1ff3a4b82125061fbab300cd21 403 -D1 05025dde26885117001801d1e5771152 
Italian-Gene b106d3e02dc0078ec0be007c8bfeb900 403 –D2 00c130e05238c568cc1751c03101105c 
Table 5.1: Mutation engine output
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The mutation engine created a number of families (groups) from the existing virus signatures 
given. Thereafter, derivation is done on each family up until the third generation. The first, 
second and third generations have suffix “D1”,”D2” and “D3” respectively  as shown in table 
5.1 above.  
5.3 Model result 
This section shows the result of the model using the trained neural network to classify any 
given virus signature into either existing or derived virus signature. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, existing virus signature is encoded with “1, 0” and derived virus signature is 
encoded with “0, 1”. Therefore, during testing, the output neuron with the highest activation 
(output) is the class predicted by the neural network (Model).   
5.3.1 The result of the model on training data 
The derived virus signatures used for training are presented to the model. The table below 
shows to which group the model classified each virus signature. 
Derived virus signatures used for training  
First generation Second generation Third generation 
0,0112 0,9902 Derived 0,1679 0,8182 Derived 0,2529 0,8603 Derived 
0,0971 0,878 Derived 0,2572 0,7532 Derived 0,1764 0,8246 Derived 
0,0238 0,9704 Derived 0,1057 0,8758 Derived 0,3473 0,8538 Derived 
0,1056 0,9331 Derived 0,5885 0,4675 Existing 0,1826 0,8004 Derived 
0,0334 0,9769 Derived 0,0575 0,9153 Derived 0,0517 0,9699 Derived 
0,0559 0,9708 Derived 0,2106 0,9103 Derived 0,9311 0,1538 Existing 
Total Signatures (%) 100 Total Signatures (%) 100 Total Signatures (%) 100 
Derived found (%) 93,5 Derived found (%) 84,4 Derived found (%) 77,9 
Existing found (%) 6,5 Existing found (%) 15,6 Existing found (%) 22,1 
 
Table 5.2: Training data results
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The table above shows some of the result of the experiment conducted with the model. The 
first result (0,0112 and 0,9902) for the first generation has its second value greater than the 
first. This means the model categorized the input signature as a derived virus signature since 
we decoded derived virus signatures as “0, 1” during the training. Furthermore, the last result 
for the third generation (0,9311 and 0,1538) has its first value greater than the second. This 
means the model categorized the input signature as an existing virus signature since we 
decoded existing virus signatures as “1, 0” during the training. All experiment results are 
interpreted in the same way.   
As shown in the table, the model was able to classify 93,5% virus signatures successfully as 
derived virus signatures and 6,5% were incorrectly classified as existing signatures in the first 
generation. Furthermore, in second generation, 84,4% virus signatures were successfully 
classified as derived virus signatures while 15,6% virus signatures were incorrectly classified 
as existing virus signatures. Lastly, for the third generation, 77,9% virus signatures were 
successfully classified as derived virus signatures and 22,1% signatures were incorrectly 
classified as existing virus signatures. 
5.3.2 The result of the model on new data 
The mutation engine of the model created new variants of existing virus signatures for ten 
experiments. That is, it generated first, second and third generations for ten experiments. The 
new variants are presented to the model and the result is shown in the tables below. It is 
observed that the model performance on the ten experiments in terms of the derived and 
existing virus signatures classified is similar with a difference of two to five signatures 
classified or not classified for each generation in all the ten experiments. Therefore, we will 
only show results for experiment 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 and 10. 
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5.3.2.1 Experiment one 
First generation Second generation Third generation 
0,0844 0,9638 Derived 0,3122 0,8133 Derived 0,016 0,98 Derived 
0,2178 0,8955 Derived 0,227 0,7478 Derived 0,4707 0,6803 Derived 
0,0394 0,9632 Derived 0,1119 0,9274 Derived 0,2625 0,8817 Derived 
0,2533 0,8172 Derived 0,4435 0,679 Derived 0,7716 0,3993 Existing 
0,1989 0,7582 Derived 0,2726 0,8031 Derived 0,0601 0,9293 Derived 
0,0317 0,9595 Derived 0,1582 0,8777 Derived 0,1452 0,9406 Derived 
0,5437 0,5096 Existing 0,7354 0,3186 Existing 0,413 0,7465 Derived 
0,0366 0,9446 Derived 0,8389 0,2525 Existing 0,974 0,0679 Existing 
0,3315 0,6154 Derived 0,1179 0,9066 Derived 0,1294 0,8627 Derived 
0,2279 0,866 Derived 0,184 0,9006 Derived 0,9366 0,1676 Existing 
Total virus signature 
(%) 
100 Total virus signature 
(%) 
100 Total virus signature 
(%) 
100 
Derived found (%) 90,9 Derived found (%) 81,8 Derived found (%) 66,2 
Existing found (%) 9,1 Existing found (%) 18,2 Existing found (%) 33,8 
 
In the first generation, the model was able to classify 90,9% signatures successfully as derived 
signatures out of the virus signatures given and 9,1% signatures were incorrectly classified as 
existing virus signatures. For the second generation, the model classified 81,8% signatures 
successfully as derived virus signatures and the remaining 18,2% signatures were incorrectly 
classified as existing virus signatures. Lastly, for the third generation, the model was able to 
classify 66,2% signatures successfully as derived signatures and the remaining 33,8% 
signatures were incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. The result is shown 
graphically in the figure below 




Figure 5.1 above shows the output of the model graphically for the first experiment. The 
percentage of derived and existing virus signatures found for each generation is shown. 
5.3.2.2 Experiment two 
 
First generation Second generation Third generation 
0,4164 0,636 Derived 0,1497 0,8725 Derived 0,841 0,347 Existing 
0,2998 0,6644 Derived 0,04 0,9651 Derived 0,6937 0,4485 Existing 
0,4208 0,6119 Derived 0,0479 0,9156 Derived 0,6841 0,45 Existing 
0,4861 0,5689 Derived 0,3519 0,6855 Derived 0,2757 0,7225 Derived 
0,1619 0,8758 Derived 0,5317 0,5808 Derived 0,0976 0,9433 Derived 
0,145 0,9211 Derived 0,5325 0,7153 Derived 0,1128 0,9216 Derived 
0,0033 0,9954 Derived 0,5371 0,659 Derived 0,7874 0,2685 Existing 
0,0433 0,9291 Derived 0,0115 0,9857 Derived 0,0097 0,9889 Derived 
0,6313 0,359 Existing 0,1557 0,8416 Derived 0,8012 0,2969 Existing 
0,4478 0,5141 Derived 0,0667 0,9305 Derived 0,5261 0,5437 Derived 
Total Signatures (%) 100 Total Signatures (%) 100 Total Signatures(%) 100 
Derived found (%) 88,3 Derived found (%) 77,9 Derived found (%) 62,3 
Existing found (%) 11,7 Existing found (%) 22,1 Existing found (%) 37,7 
 
The table above shows experiment two result. In the first generation, the model was able to 
classify 88,3% signatures successfully as derived virus signatures and 11,7% signatures were 
1st Generation 2nd  Generation 3rd Generation
Total (%) 100 100 100
Derived(%) 90,9 81,8 66,2






















Figure 5.1: Graphical representation of experiment one result
Table 5.4: Experiment two result
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incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. Furthermore, in the second generation, 77,9% 
signatures were successfully classified as derived virus signatures and the remaining 22,1% 
signatures were incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. Lastly, in the third 
generation, the model successfully classified 62,3% signatures as derived virus signatures and 
37,7% signatures were incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. The figure below 
shows the graphical representation of the results. 
 
Figure 5.2 above shows the output of the model graphically for experiment two. The percentage 
of derived and existing virus signatures found for each generation is shown. 
5.3.2.3 Experiment three 
First generation Second generation Third generation 
0,0667 0,9164 Derived 0,9795 0,0607 Existing 0,4704 0,6508 Derived 
0,0221 0,9663 Derived 0,1279 0,8741 Derived 0,6663 0,4095 Existing 
0,7873 0,215 Existing 0,833 0,1313 Existing 0,3939 0,6194 Derived 
0,4884 0,646 Derived 0,7332 0,4721 Existing 0,624 0,4892 Existing 
0,1943 0,9068 Derived 0,0066 0,9886 Derived 0,4569 0,7153 Derived 
0,6466 0,3631 Existing 0,4023 0,7275 Derived 0,1757 0,8966 Derived 
1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation
Total (%) 100 100 100
Derived (%) 88,3 77,9 62,3






















Figure 5.2: Graphical representation of experiment two result
Table 5.5: Experiment three result
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0,1512 0,8905 Derived 0,1851 0,781 Derived 0,8623 0,2772 Existing 
0,8919 0,2201 Existing 0,0246 0,9584 Derived 0,0296 0,9763 Derived 
0,0715 0,8905 Derived 0,909 0,149 Existing 0,2413 0,8007 Derived 
0,3493 0,7011 Derived 0,0474 0,933 Derived 0,0147 0,9903 Derived 
Total signatures (%) 100 Total signatures (%) 100 Total signatures (%) 100 
Derived found (%) 89,6 Derived found (%) 81,4 Derived found (%) 67,5 
Existing found (%) 10,4 Existing found (%) 18,6 Existing found (%) 32,5 
 
The table above presents experiment three result. In the first generation, the model was able to 
successfully classify 89,6% signatures as derived virus signatures and the remaining 10,4% 
signatures were incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. Furthermore, for second 
generation, the model was able to classify 81,4% signatures as derived virus signatures while 
the remaining 18,6% signatures were incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. Lastly, 
for the third generation, the model was able to classify 67,5% virus signatures as derived and 
the remaining 32,5% signatures were classified as existing. The figure below shows the 
graphical representation of the results. 
 
Figure 5.3 above shows the output of the model graphically for experiment three. The 
percentage of derived and existing virus signatures found for each generation is shown. 
1st Generation 2nd  Generation 3rd Generation
Total (%) 100 100 100
Derived(%) 89,6 81,4 67,5






















Figure 5.3: Graphical representation of experiment three result
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5.3.2.4 Experiment Eight 
First generation Second generation Third generation 
0,0991 0,8904 Derived 0,0718 0,9299 Derived 0,2443 0,7419 Derived 
0,0445 0,9678 Derived 0,2033 0,8199 Derived 0,1266 0,924 Derived 
0,1829 0,8369 Derived 0,1007 0,9336 Derived 0,0319 0,9588 Derived 
0,2079 0,7856 Derived 0,0396 0,9652 Derived 0,6252 0,4111 Existing 
0,17 0,8998 Derived 0,0097 0,9836 Derived 0,321 0,712 Derived 
0,2269 0,8581 Derived 0,148 0,8647 Derived 0,1415 0,8433 Derived 
0,5946 0,402 Existing 0,0389 0,9541 Derived 0,5859 0,3602 Existing 
0,0223 0,9692 Derived 0,2605 0,7276 Derived 0,0895 0,9363 Derived 
0,1451 0,9196 Derived 0,2634 0,7358 Derived 0,1212 0,9216 Derived 
0,2192 0,7603 Derived 0,1527 0,8983 Derived 0,544 0,7212 Derived 
Total signatures (%) 100 Total signatures (%) 100 Total signatures (%) 100 
Derived found (%) 89,6 Derived found (%) 83,1 Derived found (%) 58,4 
Existing found (%) 10,4 Existing found (%) 16,9 Existing found (%) 41,6 
 
The table above shows experiment eight result. In the first generation, the model was able to 
classify 89,6% signatures successfully as derived virus signatures and 10,4% signatures were 
incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. Furthermore, in the second generation, 83,1% 
signatures were successfully classified as derived virus signatures and the remaining 16,9% 
signatures were incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. Lastly, in the third 
generation, the model successfully classified 58,4% signatures as derived virus signatures and 
41,6% signatures were incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. The figure below 
shows the graphical representation of the results. 




The figure above shows the output of the model graphically for experiment eight. The 
percentage of derived and existing virus signatures found for each generation is shown. 
5.3.2.5 Experiment Nine 
First generation Second generation Third generation 
0,2722 0,8287 Derived 0,1444 0,906 Derived 0,0634 0,9227 Derived 
0,2824 0,7584 Derived 0,1611 0,8864 Derived 0,2157 0,893 Derived 
0,9387 0,2627 Existing 0,4565 0,6876 Derived 0,2024 0,7508 Derived 
0,3796 0,5423 Derived 0,1706 0,8696 Derived 0,0022 0,9961 Derived 
0,1678 0,8315 Derived 0,5549 0,6878 Derived 0,1299 0,8336 Derived 
0,0456 0,9691 Derived 0,5947 0,4937 Existing 0,0286 0,9565 Derived 
0,4005 0,7387 Derived 0,2557 0,8671 Derived 0,0737 0,8717 Derived 
0,363 0,7467 Derived 0,2226 0,8558 Derived 0,0444 0,9569 Derived 
0,301 0,8319 Derived 0,0428 0,9588 Derived 0,352 0,7141 Derived 
0,0607 0,9461 Derived 0,082 0,8875 Derived 0,2113 0,8303 Derived 
Total signatures (%) 100 Total signatures (%) 100 Total signatures (%) 100 
Derived found (%) 92,2 Derived found (%) 85,7 Derived found (%) 61,0 
Existing found (%) 7,8 Existing found (%) 14,3 Existing found (%) 39,0 
 
1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation
Total (%) 100 100 100
Derived (%) 89,6 83,1 58,4






















Figure 5.4: Graphical representation of experiment eight result
Table 5.7 :  Experiment nine result
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The table above presents experiment nine result. In the first generation, the model was able to 
classify 92,2% signatures successfully as derived virus signatures and 7,8% signatures were 
incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. Furthermore, in the second generation, 85,7% 
signatures were successfully classified as derived virus signatures and the remaining 14,3% 
signatures were incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. Lastly, in the third 
generation, the model successfully classified 61% signatures as derived virus signatures and 
39% signatures were incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. The figure below shows 
the graphical representation of the results. 
 
The figure above shows the output of the model graphically for experiment nine. The 
percentage of derived and existing virus signatures found for each generation is shown. 
5.3.2.6 Experiment Ten 
First generation Second generation Third generation 
0,3301 0,7172 Derived 0,0989 0,9382 Derived 0,0328 0,9539 Derived 
0,0561 0,9468 Derived 0,5398 0,5812 Derived 0,0648 0,9434 Derived 







Total (%) 100 100 100
Derived (%) 92,2 85,7 61




















nt Virus Detection Rate
Figure 5.5: Graphical representation of experiment nine result
Table 5.8 :  Experiment ten results
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0,2907 0,87 Derived 0,0179 0,9721 Derived 0,2528 0,7142 Derived 
0,0119 0,9841 Derived 0,76 0,3854 Existing 0,3144 0,7639 Derived 
0,3118 0,8458 Derived 0,1355 0,8211 Derived 0,7956 0,2975 Existing 
0,2621 0,8241 Derived 0,22 0,8828 Derived 0,0808 0,9362 Derived 
0,0164 0,9711 Derived 0,9518 0,064 Existing 0,8016 0,2788 Existing 
0,2098 0,8558 Derived 0,7917 0,3095 Existing 0,03 0,9686 Derived 
0,1972 0,8228 Derived 0,8034 0,2937 Existing 0,216 0,884 Derived 
Total signatures (%) 100 Total signatures (%) 100 Total signatures (%) 100 
Derived found (%) 90,9 Derived found (%) 87,0 Derived found (%) 67,5 
Existing found (%) 9,1 Existing found (%) 13,0 Existing found (%) 32,5 
 
The table above shows some experiment ten result. In the first generation, the model was able 
to classify 90,9% signatures successfully as derived virus signatures and 9,1% signatures were 
incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. Furthermore, in the second generation, 87% 
signatures were successfully classified as derived virus signatures and the remaining 13% 
signatures were incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. Lastly, in the third 
generation, the model successfully classified 67,5% signatures as derived virus signatures and 
32,5% signatures were incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. The figure below 
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Derived (%) 90,9 87 67,5

























The figure above shows the output of the model graphically for experiment ten. The percentage 
of derived and existing virus signatures found for each generation is shown. 
5.3.2.7 Overall result for all experiments 
 
Experiment 
1st Generation (%) 2nd Generation (%) 3rd Generation (%) 
Derived Existing Derived Existing Derived Existing 
1 90,9 9,1 81,8 18,2 66,2 33,8 
2 88,3 11,7 77,9 22,1 62,3 37,7 
3 89,6 10,4 81,4 18,6 67,5 32,5 
4 90,9 9,1 80,5 19,5 70,1 29,9 
5 89,6 10,4 83,1 16,9 64,9 35,1 
6 92,2 7,8 83,1 16,9 62,3 37,7 
7 90,9 9,1 84,4 15,6 72,7 27,3 
8 89,6 10,4 83,1 16,9 58,4 41,6 
9 92,2 7,8 85,7 14,3 61,0 39,0 
10 90,9 9,1 87,0 13,0 67,5 32,5 
 
The ten experiments conducted consist of a number of derived virus signatures. In the first 
generation of all the experiments, the model was able to classify an average of 90,5% signatures 
successfully as derived virus signatures and 9,5% signatures were incorrectly classified as 
existing virus signatures. Furthermore, in the second generation of all the experiments, an 
average of 82,9% signatures were successfully classified as derived virus signatures and the 
remaining 17,1% signatures were incorrectly classified as existing virus signatures. Lastly, in 
the third generation of all the experiments, the model successfully classified an average of 
Figure 5.6: Graphical representation of experiment ten result
Table 5.9: Result for all experiments
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65,3% signatures as derived virus signatures and 34,7% signatures were incorrectly classified 




The figure above presents the overall results for all the ten experiments conducted with the 
model and also shows the percentage of derived and existing virus found in each generation. 
 
 
1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation
Total (%) 100 100 100
Derived (%) 90,5 82,9 65,3
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Figure 5.7: Graphical representation of the result of all experiments
Figure 5.8 :  Plot showing the results for all experiments with generations
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The plot above shows the percentage of derived and existing virus signatures as classified by 
the model. As shown in the graph, the count of virus signatures that are classified as derived 
drops as the generation increases. On the contrary, the count of virus signatures classified as 
existing keeps increasing as the generation increases even though all signatures used are 
derived. This means that at a point after many generations, the derived virus signatures will be 
seen as a new or different virus signature. This explains the reason why signature scanning 
could not detect derived viruses. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the results of the experiments conducted with the model proposed in the 
previous chapter. It is observed in all the experiments conducted that the first generation has 
highest number of derived virus detection rate than the other two generations. The second 
generation also showed a higher detection rate than the third generation which has the least 
detection rate. Based on this, a conclusion can be drawn that the correlation between the actual 
virus signature and its derivatives decreases further down along the generations. This means 
that after many generations of a virus changing forms, its variants will no longer look like the 
original. The variants will look like a completely new virus even though the variants and the 
original virus will always have same behaviour and operation with similar effects. 




 CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This is the concluding chapter of this dissertation. The research work is summarized along with 
an evaluation of the achievement of research objectives. The direction for future work is 
highlighted. 
6.2 Summary 
The problem studied has a serious impact in information security. The protection of computing 
devices against computer viruses has been a major problem in the field of information security 
since its first appearance in the 1970s and the damage caused by viruses is increasing year after 
year. Early viruses had no serious impact asides displaying some annoying pop up messages. 
However, today’s viruses have a reputation and financial impact. Over the years, computer 
viruses have become and operate in stealth mode to avoid detection. This is usually achieved 
with many modern obfuscation techniques. Although, it is argued that new viruses are created 
daily. However, most of the supposedly ‘new’ viruses are not necessarily created from the 
scratch, rather the supposedly ‘new’ viruses are products of the existing viruses using different 
obfuscation techniques to change their look and form thereby looking like a new virus at every 
infection. The self-modification ability that the modern viruses’ exhibit has put strain on virus 
detection by signature scanning which is regarded as the oldest and the most commonly used 
detection technique. The problem of computing device against virus is not just about protection 
against known virus but also against unknown viruses. The unknown virus could be new or 
derived virus (Virus that comes into existence as a result of modification of existing viruses). 
68 
 
This research work therefore explores the use of neural networks together with a mutation 
engine to try and increase the detection rate of derived viruses. The mutation engine creates 
derivatives of existing virus signatures. The neural network is trained with both derived and 
existing virus signatures and is used as a detector to detect existing viruses and their variants 
in a computer system. 
6.3 Conclusion 
This research presents a novel model for detecting derived virus. The ability of the proposed 
model to accurately classify derived virus signatures means that it can be used as virus detector 
in a computer system. The model has successfully improve the rate of detecting derived viruses 
from 70% as per Golovko & Bezobrazov (2015). Furthermore, the model is better than 
signature scanning. This is mainly because it does not depend solely on a set of pre-defined 
virus signature; it also postulate what future signatures might look like and makes an attempt 
to detect them. Moreover, the model is able to classify viruses used for the training and also 
their new variants that were not used during the training. Currently, the proposed model has an 
average success rate of:  
 80.2% on detecting existing signatures,  
 85.2% on signatures used for training and  
 80% on the average for derived virus signatures.  
In terms of the derived virus signatures; this includes success rate of 91% on first generation, 
83% on second generation and 65% on third generation. Of note in these results is that the 
accuracy of detecting derived viruses decreases linearly as the number of generations increase. 
For example, the success rate would have been even lower on the fourth generation than it is 
on the third. This is to be expected because as more generations are added to the training set; 
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the difference between the original and the derivative virus signature gets even bigger. 
Furthermore, this explains the difficulty in current anti-virus systems to detect derived viruses. 
Although, the result seems to have a lesser accuracy as compared to some existing solutions; it 
is important to note that the proposed model was able to detect derived viruses which cannot 
be detected by existing systems.   
6.4   Recommendations for Future Work 
Our future work will try and improve the accuracy of the model. Furthermore, future work will 
experiment with variable virus signature sizes and those that contain special characters. Finally, 
the model is to be trained with encrypted virus signatures for robustness. 
It is recommended that future research efforts continue along the direction of this study to 
explore this area in depth. It will be a great benefit to the field of information security to have 
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